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Abstract
A large literature describes how local risk sharing networks can help individuals smooth consumption
in the face of idiosyncratic economic shocks. However, when an entire community faces a large covariate
shock, and when the transaction costs of transfers are high, these risk sharing networks are likely to be
less eective. In this paper, we document how a new technology { mobile phones { reduces transaction
costs and enables Rwandans to share risk quickly over long distances. We examine a comprehensive
database of person-to-person transfers of mobile airtime and nd that individuals send this rudimentary
form of \mobile money" to friends and family aected by natural disasters. Using the Lake Kivu
earthquake of 2008 to identify the eect of a large covariate shock on interpersonal transfers, we estimate
that a current-day earthquake would result in the transfer of between $22,000 and $30,000 to individuals
living near the epicenter. We further show that the pattern of transfers is most consistent with a model
of reciprocal risk sharing, where transfers are determined by past reciprocity and geographical proximity,
rather than one of pure charity or altruism, in which transfers would be expected to be increasing in the
wealth of the sender and decreasing in the wealth of the recipient.
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1 Introduction
When markets for credit and insurance are incomplete, informal risk sharing networks often help individuals
smooth consumption over time and in the face of temporary economic shocks (Rosenzweig 1988, Townsend
1994, Udry 1994). However, these networks are most eective at insuring against idiosyncratic shocks that are
uncorrelated across members of the same network. When a large covariate shock aects an entire community,
local risk sharing networks are less eective.1 While individuals could in principle receive support from friends
and family living outside of the aected region, sending money over distance is costly and individuals are
quite sensitive to the cost of remitting (Yang 2008). More critically, aordable mechanisms for transferring
money over long distances often do not exist. In much of East Africa, for instance, formal money transfer
systems such as Western Union are only available in major urban areas, and informal methods (such as
sending money with a public bus driver) are slow, intermittent, and expensive. Thus, the empirical evidence
indicates that in-kind and monetary transfers typically occur between friends and family within small, local
communities (Udry 1994, De Weerdt & Research 2002, Fafchamps & Gubert 2007).2
In an increasing number of developing countries, the mobile phone network has begun to provide a new
mechanism for interpersonal transfers which could potentially remove the geographic constraint from risk
sharing relationships. \Branchless banking" systems, with over 80 deployments worldwide, allow individuals
to transfer \mobile money" from one phone to another at a fraction of the cost of existing alternatives
(McKay & Pickens 2010). Typically, a mobile subscriber types in the phone number of the recipient and
the amount to be transferred, and the balance is deducted from the sender's account and added to the
recipient's. The transaction takes a few seconds to complete, and costs at least 50 percent less than what
it would cost to send money through traditional channels (Ivatury & Mas 2008). Beyond the convenience
and reduction in transaction costs, mobile banking systems are noteworthy for their increasing ubiquity. For
instance, a recent study in Kenya found that although only 23 percent of adults owned a bank account, over
50 percent of adults were registered users the mobile banking system (FSD Kenya 2009).3 Worldwide, it is
estimated that by 2012 there will be 1.7 billion people with a mobile phone but no bank account (CGAP
and GSMA 2009).
In this paper, we explore one mechanism by which such mobile money systems may have a meaningful
1See, for instance, evidence on limited giving in response to famines in India (Sen 1983, Dreze & Sen 1991).
2Udry (1994), for instance, observes that 75 percent of surveyed Nigerian households made informal loans, but that almost all
loans occurred within a village. Fafchamps & Gubert (2007) similarly observe that geographic proximity is a major determinant
of sharing patterns: when two households live near each other, it is more likely that the one will help the other. Kurosaki &
Fafchamps (2002) and de Weerdt & Fafchamps (2010) obtain similar ndings for Pakistan and Tanzania, respectively.
3Over $200 million dollars is transferred over the Kenayan mobile phone network each day. Pulver (2009) estimates that
47% of the Kenyan population uses mobile phones as the primary method of sending money. Similarly, in surveys conducted
by the rst author in Rwanda in July 2009, we found that 97.3% of Rwandan phone users had heard of the Rwandan mobile
transfer service, and that nearly 80% had used it within the last year.
2
economic impact on the lives of their users. We measure the extent to which individuals transfers funds
over the network in order to help friends and family cope with severe economic shocks. Recent survey-
based evidence from Kenya suggest that households with access to \mobile money" are better insured
against such shocks (Jack & Suri 2011). We provide an empirical test of this theory using an unequivocally
exogenous shock and detailed micro-level data on interpersonal transfers. Specically, we test whether a
large earthquake in Rwanda caused people in unaected parts of the country to transfer a rudimentary form
of \mobile money" to people living close to the earthquake's epicenter.4 Using a rich source of data that
contains a record of all mobile phone activity that occurred over a 4-year period in Rwanda, we show that
the earthquake caused individuals living outside the aected area to transfer a large and signicant volume
of airtime to people living close to the earthquake's epicenter. The eect is robust to dierent estimation
strategies, and does not spuriously occur on a number of \placebo" days. We nd similar, albeit muted,
eects following a number of oods. Our results are robust to dierent estimation strategies. Though the
total volume of money sent following the earthquake was small in absolute terms { primarily because the
banking service was launched shortly before the earthquake occurred { simple calculations indicate that
if a similar earthquake were to occur today, the current value of mobile money sent would be roughly
USD$22,000 to $30,000. This is particularly striking given the fact that, at the time of the earthquake, the
liquidity of airtime transfers was rather limited. As the capabilities of such mobile banking systems expand
and phone-based transactions become the norm, we would expect the volume (and utility) of such transfers
to increase.
From a policy perspective, we are also interested in identifying which types of individuals are most likely
to benet from access to the mobile phone network. Our second set of results thus analyzes heterogeneity
between users in propensity to receive a transfer after the earthquake. For each of Rwanda's 1.5 million
mobile subscribers, we measure the approximate size of the individual's social network using the network
dataset, and construct a wealth index for each subscriber based on data collected through phone interviews.
We nd that wealthier phone users are signicantly more likely to receive a transfer after the earthquake.
Individuals with a large number of contacts are more likely to receive transfers on normal days, but are not
signicantly more likely to receive a transfer in the day of the earthquake. In line with prior research on
technology adoption, these results imply that there may be regressive consequences to the rapid uptake of
mobile phones in developing countries, particularly if the better-o individuals substitute out of informal
4During the period we analyze, mobile subscribers were only able to transfer prepaid airtime balance from person to person.
This airtime could be used to make calls, could be resent to other subscribers, or could be sold informally for a small commission.
However, there were no formal outlets at which the airtime could be converted to cash, and at the time of the earthquake it
could not be used to purchase goods. In February 2010, the telecommunications operator launched a fully-edged Mobile Money
service, similar to the M-PESA system in Kenya, which allows subscribers to convert airtime to cash, and which will soon allow
for over-the-counter purchases with airtime, as well as interest-bearing savings accounts.
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risk-sharing arrangements and into technology-mediated relationships (Chandrasekhar et al. 2011, Stiglitz
2001, Jowett 2003).
Finally, we use the exogenous variation in transfers caused by the earthquake to better understand
the motives that cause people to give in the rst place. Broadly speaking, the literature on giving has
dierentiated between charitable motives where the giver derives utility from the act of giving (Becker 1976,
Andreoni 1990, Fehr & Schmidt 1999), and reciprocal arrangements where giving is motivated primarily by
the expectation of future reciprocation (Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon et al. 2002). These two stylized models
have divergent empirical predictions, and we nd that our data is more consistent with the latter model
in which giving is motivated, at least in part, by quid-pro-quo. Namely, we nd that (i) giving increases
in the wealth of the recipient but not of the sender, which contradicts most models of charitable giving;
(ii) transfers caused by the earthquake are signicantly more likely if the recipient has previously sent to
the sender; and (iii) transfers decrease with the distance between sender and recipient, consistent with the
literature suggesting that information and monitoring costs can impede risk-sharing arrangements (De Vreyer
et al. 2010, Ligon 1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline our estimation strategy
to estimate the eect of exogenous shocks on interpersonal transfers, and develop a simple model that
empirically dierentiates between transfers driven by charity and those driven by expectations of reciprocity.
The data, and a brief description of mobile phone services in Rwanda, are given in Section 3. We present our
empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks, and discusses the remaining
limitations of the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Identication and estimation
A Shock and transfers
The rst objective of this paper is to investigate whether phone users located in areas aected by large
covariate shocks are sent an unusually large amount of airtime from individuals living in parts of the country
unaected by the shock. Taking a large but geographically isolated earthquake as an exogenous shock, we
focus on the transfers that occurred immediately after the earthquake.
We investigate this at three levels: regional (district and cell tower); individual; and dyadic. From
a policy point of view, the regional analysis is perhaps the most relevant: we want to know how much
airtime transfers the aected regions as a whole received as a result of the shock, and thus form an idea of
the aggregate welfare benet that was achieved. It does, however, matter whether airtime transfers were
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broadly distributed across the population, or only reached a happy few. Analysis at the individual level
can thus provide additional insights as to the distribution of the insurance benets from airtime transfers
at the time of the shock. Individual analysis also makes it possible to ascertain whether airtime transfers at
the time of the shock went to individuals who had sent and received airtime before, or to phone users who
had never used the service. Combining these two types of analysis is seldom possible because researchers
typically only have either aggregate or survey data. We have a census of all transfers and can thus look at
both levels simultaneously.
Dyadic analysis refers to analysis of transfers at the level of pairs of users { or dyads. By looking at
airtime transfers at the level of dyads, we can investigate whether transfers originate from a wide variety
of sources, or are instead concentrated on a few sources which whom the recipient already had transfered
airtime. Observing transfers at this level of disaggregation provides insight into the nature of airtime transfers
at the time of the shocks. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to provide an analysis of transfers in
response to a shock that combines all three levels of aggregation.
Formally, let ijrt denote the gross transfer of airtime from phone user j to phone user i located in
location r at time t. Further dene irt =
P
j ijrt the total gross transfers received by user i in region r at
time t. Finally, dene rt =
P
i irt the total gross transfers received by users in location r at time t. To
minimize the likelihood that our results are driven by dierential growth in mobile usage across locations,
we restrict the analysis to a specic time window Tmin  ts  Tmax around the time of the shock ts.
We estimate models of the form:
rt = 1 + 1Srt + 1Xrt + t + r + "rt (1)
irt = 2 + 2Srt + 2Xirt + t + i + "irt (2)
ijrt = 3 + 3Srt + 3Xijrt + t + ij + "ijrt (3)
where Srt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if location r received a shock on day t, Xrt; Xirt; and Xijrt are
time-varying controls, t is a vector of time dummies, and r; i, and ij are xed eects for the region,
individual, and dyad, respectively. In regression (2), individuals i who never receive airtime transfers are
excluded since they do not help identify 2, leaving 110,324 unique individuals. In regression (3), pairs in
which i never receives airtime from j are similarly omitted. Time dummies t control for long-term growth in
trac, as well as day-of-the-week (e.g., week-end) and day-of-the-month (e.g., payday) eects that aect all
regions similarly. Location and recipient xed eects r and i control for the fact that dierent locations or
users are more likely to receive transfers on average. Dyadic xed eects ij control for the average intensity
of transfer ows between two users.
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Identication is achieved as in a dierence-in-dierence framework: parameters 1; 2 and 3 represent the
average treatment eect of the shock. The exogeneity of Srt is guaranteed if its timing could not have been
predicted, i.e., the shock constitutes a natural experiment. If 1 > 0; 2 > 0 and 3 > 0, this is interpreted as
evidence that the shock Srt caused an increase in airtime transfers to users in the aected region. We check
the robustness of our results in various ways, notably by varying the time window over which the models are
estimated and by running a number of falsication and placebo tests. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), in
individual and dyadic regressions standard errors are clustered by location (i.e., cell-phone tower identier).
B Charity or reciprocity
The second objective of the paper is to examine which types of individuals are more likely to give or receive
transfers at the time of the shock. Our ultimate aim is to elucidate the motives behind transfers that are
made in response to a publicly observed shock. We follow Leider et al. (2009) and divide the motivations for
prosocial behavior into two rough categories which, for short, we call `charity' and `reciprocity.' While these
rough categories are not mutually exclusive and do not circumscribe the entire range of motives for giving,
they do produce divergent empirical redictions that we can test with the data at our disposal.
By charity we mean transfers that are not based on quid-pro-quo. This refers to broad class of motives
in which the sender receives direct utility from the act of giving. The reason could be altruism (e.g. Becker
1976, Cox & Fafchamps 2007), subjective reputational rewards (Benabou & Tirole 2006), preferences over
distributions (Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Charness & Rabin 2002), or a sense of moral obligation grounded in
religion or philosophical beliefs. It could also be what some have called `warm glow', that is, the pure
satisfaction of having done a good deed, without necessarily thinking about the consequences (Andreoni
1990, List & Lucking-Reiley 2002). Broadly speaking, these dierent motives predict that giving increases
with wealth or income because the marginal utility cost of giving falls while the utility from giving either
rises or remains constant. It follows that if the primary motive for airtime transfers is a charitable one, we
expect transfers on average to come from richer users and to ow to poorer users.5 Since charitable transfers
are not embedded in interpersonal relationships, they need not depend on past interactions between users,
or on the capacity to directly monitor the use of the funds and the eect of the shock.
Reciprocity, in contrast, refers to transfers that are embedded in long-term relationships of risk sharing
and favor exchange. Following Coate & Ravallion (1993), much of the theoretical literature on risk sharing
models it as a repeated game of mutual insurance (Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon et al. 2002). The main insight
from this literature is that voluntary transfers in response to shocks are capped by expected future recipro-
cation: if j expects to receive few future insurance benets from sharing risk with i, then j will give little
5Except, in the latter case, for particularly careless `warm-glow' givers.
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to i today in response to a shock to i. Furthermore, imperfect observability by j of i's true need generates
moral hazard and undermines risk sharing (Fafchamps 1992).6
If reciprocity is the primary motive for transfers after a shock, we expect to observe more transfers
between people who have already transferred airtime to each other and who are in a better position to
monitor one another because of social or geographical proximity. Unlike the charitable motive, reciprocity
does not make strong predictions regarding relative wealth and the direction of ows. We could observe ows
from the rich to the poor if the poor reciprocate in ways other than airtime (Fafchamps 1999, Platteau 1995).
Alternatively, we could observe airtime transfers from the poor to the rich, for instance because airtime is
more valuable to the rich who consume more phone services and reciprocate in ways that are more useful to
the poor. Or transfers may ow between users with similar income, as in the example of mutual insurance
among equals studied by Coate & Ravallion (1993).
To investigate whether transfers caused by the shock are more consistent with charity or reciprocity, we
estimate heterogeneous eect models of the form:
rt = 1 + 1Srt + 1Xrt + 1ZrSrt + 1ZrDt + t + r + "rt (4)
irt = 2 + 2Srt + 2Xirt + 2ZirSrt + 2ZirDt + t + i + "irt (5)
ijrt = 3 + 3Srt + 3Xijrt + 3ZirSrt + 4ZjSrt + 3ZjrDt + 4ZiDt + t + ij + "ijrt (6)
where Zr; Zir, and Zijr are characteristics associated with either reciprocity or charity and Dt = 1 for all
regions on the day of the shock, and 0 otherwise. Terms of the form ZrDt are included to control for the
possibility that, in the country as a whole, variation in Zr aects transfers on the day of the shock dierently
from other days. The heterogeneous eects models (4)-(6) thus allow us to dierentiate between charity and
reciprocity along three dierent dimensions:
Wealth: Let Zir be a proxy for the wealth or income of a user in the area aected by the shock. If
transfers at the time of the shock follow primarily a charitable motive, we expect 2 < 0 and 3 < 0.
Observing 2 > 0 or 3 > 0 could, in contrast, arise under reciprocity if, as is likely in our data, the rich
consume more phone services and receive help in kind. By the same reasoning, with the charitable motive
we expect 4 > 0 where Zj proxies for the wealth or income of someone outside the aected area: ceteris
paribus, unaected rich people and people residing in wealthier urban areas should give more. This need not
be the case under reciprocity. If, in times of trouble, airtime transfers ow primarily to individuals who are
richer and better connected, the insurance benets of airtime transfers may be unequally distributed. This
6Similarly, if mutual assistance is based on reciprocity in the sense of Charness & Rabin (2002), then i may want to observe
j's true need to avoid being `suckered' { even if the game is not repeated.
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may open the door to policy intervention aimed at broadening the insurance benets of airtime transfers to
weaker members of society.
Social Network Diversity: Under the reciprocity motive, being in multiple risk sharing or favor exchange
relationships should increase the likelihood of receiving assistance at the time of a large shock. We therefore
expect users with more relationships to be better insured against shocks, that is to receive more. Hence
we expect 2 > 0 when Zir is a proxy for the number of contacts or relationships i is engaged in. We also
expect 3 > 0 when Zir captures past transfer activity between i and j: the more activity there was in the
past, the more intense the relationship, and the more we expect i to receive at the time of the shock. We
also investigate whether transfers at the time of the shock increase with past transfers from i to j, or past
transfers from j to i. In the former case, help during the shock can be seen as a form of reciprocation: the
more i has transferred to j in the past, the more i receives at the time of the shock. In the latter case, the
interpretation is that j provides regular support to i, and does so during the shock as well. This suggests
that j is a regular source of support for i.
Social Network Topology: Finally, we investigate the geographical pattern of transfers at the time of the
shock. The reason for doing so is that, although our data has many observations, we have little information
about each of them. One thing we do have, however, is an idea of the geographical location of each user.
This information can be used to construct another indirect test of charity versus reciprocity. The intuition
behind the test is that, if geographical proximity makes monitoring easier and makes it more likely that
people are related and in long-term relationship, we expect to observe more transfers from people nearby,
but outside the area directly aected by the shock. This idea can be illustrated with a simple model as
follows.
Suppose that we observe the distance dijt between i and j. Because people living in the immediate
vicinity of j are likely to have been aected by the shock, they are unlikely to be in a position to assist
j. Consequently, we expect most transfers to originate from users located outside the immediately aected
area. Let T be the minimum distance from the aected area such that residents are unaected by the shock,
which the USGS estimates to be roughly 20km in the case of the Lake Kivu earthquake.7 Individuals i such
that dij  T are better able to assist residents j of the aected area.
If transfers follow a charitable motive, we expect ij to respond only to i's need and to j's capacity
to assist. On most mobile banking platforms, the cost of transferring funds from j to i is negligible and
independent of distance. It follows that E[ij jdij ] should increase with distance up to the point where
7http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/eqinthenews/2008/us2008mzam/, accessed March 2011
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dij  T , after which it should no longer depend on distance. In other words, we should observe:
@E[ij jdij ]
@dij
> 0 if dij < T
@E[ij jdij ]
@dij
= 0 if dij  T
By contrast, if willingness to help relies on quid-pro-quo, then j's capacity to monitor i's actions matters.
In the context of our study, it is natural to assume that monitoring costs increase monotonically with distance
dij : for instance, if j wants to verify the damage to i (e.g., injury, destroyed building), j has to travel to
the aected area, and the cost of travel increases with distance. Thus, if the need to monitor constrains
transfers, we expect that:
@E[ij jdij ]
@dij
 0 if dij  T
i.e., the further away j resides from i, the more costly it is to verify the eect of the shock on i, and the
harder it is to overcome j's fear of being cheated.
To recapitulate, in all cases we expect transfers to initially rise with distance until a threshold distance T
is reached, far enough from the shock to have been aected directly. If transfers follow a charitable motive
and do not depend on monitoring, they should not vary with distance after that. If monitoring matters,
however, we expect transfers to decrease with distance.
3 Data
The primary dataset used in this paper comes from Rwanda's dominant telecommunications operator, which
until recently held an almost complete monopoly on mobile telephony in the country.8 The data contain a
comprehensive log of all activity that occurred over the mobile phone network from 2005 through the end
of 2008. We observe detailed information on every call made and all airtime purchased and transferred in
Rwanda on the dominant mobile phone network. In total, there are over 50 billion transactions logged,
covering 1.5 million users over four years.
During the four-year period for which we have data, uptake of mobile phones was extremely rapid.
According to recent estimates, roughly one quarter of the Rwandan population owns a mobile phone, with
recent compound growth exceeding 75% annually (Table 1).9 These trends are typical of other sub-Saharan
nations, despite the fact that the cost of a mobile phone is quite high: roughly $50 for the phone, and an
8During the window of time we examine, the operator we focus on maintains over 90% market share of the mobile market.
The company's primary competitor had did not gain traction in the market until the end of 2008, and only very recently has
the market become competitive. The number of landlines in Rwanda is insignicant (roughly 0.25% penetration).
9Data accessed from http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Reports.aspx December 2010.
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Table 1: Mobile phone penetration: Number of mobile phones per 100 inhabitants.
2000 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Annual Growth
Rwanda 0.49 0.78 1.49 2.47 6.53 24.3 77.1%
South Africa 18.28 23.39 35.93 71.60 87.08 92.67 17.4%
United States 38.53 44.77 54.90 71.43 83.51 97.1 9.1%
Source: International Telecommunication Union
additional $0.20 per minute and $0.10 per SMS (see Republic of Rwanda (2010) and Donner (2008)).10 By
contrast, less than 0.25% of the population own a landline.
Phone-related costs represent a signicant share of household expenditures (Ureta 2005). Access to and
use of mobile phones is not distributed evenly within the population, however: mobile phone owners tend
to be older, wealthier, better educated, and predominantly male compared to the Rwandan population at
large (e.g., Blumenstock & Eagle (2010)).
In many developed economies phone users typically rely on xed-term contracts and pay their balances
at the end of the month. In Rwanda, all phone usage is prepaid. Individuals buy airtime vouchers from
stores and street vendors, the credit is deposited on their prepaid account, then debited as calls are made and
other services used. Top-up vouchers are sold in denominations ranging from US$0.10 to US$20. No call or
text message can be made without prepaid credit. Receiving a call or text message is always free, however,
and all costs are paid by the calling party. Many people carry a phone but rarely make calls. There are
systematic dierences in how people use their phones, e.g., rich people are more likely to make calls, women
are more likely to receive calls, and poor people tend to have fewer contacts in the network (Blumenstock &
Eagle 2010).
A Transfers
Our analysis focuses on usage of a rudimentary mobile banking service that allows for interpersonal transfers
of mobile phone airtime. Use of the service is free and all users are automatically enrolled. The service
was launched in October 2006, but usage was relatively modest until the middle of 2008 when promotional
campaigns encouraged a large number of individuals to start using the system. Boosted by the success of
mobile banking in neighboring Kenya, the capabilities of the Rwandan system have since been expanded, and
there are currently close to a million users of the system. In early 2010 other forms of mobile banking were
included, such as interest-bearing savings accounts. Further expansions are planned to allow the payment
of over-the-counter transactions.
10The ITU estimates the monthly \price basket" for mobile service to be $12.30 per month, though it is unclear how
representative this gure is for the average citizen. The price basket is calculated based on the prepaid price for 25 calls per
month spread over the same mobile network, other mobile networks, and mobile to xed calls and during peak, o-peak, and
weekend times. The basket also includes 30 text messages per month (http://devdata.worldbank.org/ict/rwa_ict.pdf).
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Table 2: Summary statistics of mobile network data.
Dates covered All dates Earthquake window
10/1/2006-7/1/2008 1/3/2008-3/3/2008
Panel A: Aggregate trac
Number of Me2U transactions 9,202,954 362,053
Number of unique users 1,084,085 119,745
Number of people who send airtime 870,099 48,295
Number of people who receive airtime 946,855 101,351
Number of people who both send and receive 732,869 29,901
Number of unique dyads 646,713 159,204
Panel B: Basic statistics (12/1/2007-4/1/2008) Mean S.D.
Transactions per user (send+receive) 6.05 12.05
Average distance per transaction (km) 13.51 27.67
Average transaction value (RWF) 223.58 652.02
Notes: The window 10/1/2006-7/1/2008 encompasses the entire dataset with valid data on interpersonal airtime
transfers. The window 1/3/2008-3/3/2008 is the same window used in later regressions. US$1=550RWF.
The main dataset used in our analysis is a log of all mobile-based airtime transfers that occurred between
October 2006 and December 2009. For each transaction, the data contain unique identiers for sender and
receiver, the monetary value of the airtime sent, and the time and date at which the transfer occurred.
We also rely on a related data set that contains information about phone call activity. Every time a user
makes or receives a phone call, the cell tower nearest to the user is logged. Since we also have records of
the geo-coordinates of each cell tower, we can infer the approximate location of each mobile subscriber over
time. Figure 1 depicts the spatial distribution of cell phone towers in early 2008 { the median area covered
by a single cell phone tower is 72km2. Thus, for each user on each day, we infer that his location is the same
as the cell tower through which the majority of his calls were routed.11
Figure 2 shows the distribution of distances over which transfers are sent in the month prior to the
Lake Kivu earthquake, for transactions involving at least one user in the earthquake region. While the vast
majority of transfers are sent over a short distance, there are a large number of transfers sent to and from
the capital of Kigali, which is approximately 150km from the epicenter. Additional summary statistics of
the dataset are presented in Table 2.
B Social networks and wealth index
For condentiality reasons, each user in our dataset is anonymous and we do not observe basic demographic
information such as the age, gender, or education level. We are nevertheless able to construct variables
of interest based on phone usage. For instance, it is possible to compute the number of unique contacts
11Note that cellular coverage is not aected by topology to the same extent as radio transmitters as in Yanagizawa-Drott
(2010). Using more sophisticated locational inference, such as the individual's center of mass, does not have a noticeable eect
on our results.
11
Figure 1: Map of Rwanda showing the location of mobile phone towers (as of February 2008) and the location
of the Lake Kivu earthquake of 2008. Each black dot represents a cell tower, with the approximate area
covered by the tower demarcated by adjacent Voronoi cells. The epicenter of the earthquake is shown with
red concentric circles.
with whom a user has communicated over a given interval of time, as well as the geographic distribution of
these contacts. Appendix A presents summary statistics of a number of social network variables that can be
computed from the data.
Wealth is believed to play an important role in the way people share risk. As we saw in Section B,
dierences in wealth or permanent income are predicted to generate dierent patterns of transfers in the
immediate aftermath of an emergency, depending on whether these transfers follow motives of charity or
reciprocity, broadly dened. To construct a proxy for wealth we proceed in three steps as follows. The
complete details of the procedure are described in (Blumenstock et al. 2010).
Using a Demographic and Health Survey of 10,000 households with detailed consumption and expen-
diture information (Government of Rwanda, 2008), we rst estimate a predicting equation for the annual
expenditures Yid of household i in district d. This equation captures the relationship between Yid and various
predictors such as housing characteristics Hid and assets Aid that are more easily disclosed by households.
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Figure 2: Distribution of distances over which transfers are sent to and from the earthquake region.
The predicting equation:
Yid = +
hmaxX
j
jHid +
amaxX
k
kAid + d + id (7)
is estimated with district xed eects using d. From equation (7) we can estimate the predicted annual
expenditures bYid of a household from the assets and durables Hid and assets Aid that it owns. Predicted
expenditure bYid is taken as proxy for permanent income.
In a second step, we use data from a phone survey to relate Hid and Aid to phone usage. The survey,
conducted by the authors, covers the random sample of approximately 900 mobile phone users used to
generate Table 12. Basic demographic information was collected, together with data on Hid and Aid. Armed
with Hid and Aid it is possible to compute predicted annual expenditures bYid using coecient estimates from
equation (7).
In the third step we compute, for each phone user, a vector of phone usage variables Xir thought to be
correlated with income, such as the total number of calls made and the average amount of airtime purchased
over a given time interval: presumably richer individuals make more calls, and purchase airtime using larger
denomination top-up vouchers. The variables are summarized in Table (12). Data on interpersonal transfers
is excluded from Xir. We then t a exible model of the form:
bYid = f(Xir)
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and estimate f(:) using data from the phone user survey.12 Our wealth index is the predicted
bbY id obtained
by applying the estimated exible function bf(:) to the full sample of 1.5 million phone users. This variable
is used as proxy for wealth or permanent income when estimating heterogeneous eect equations (4) to (6).
4 Results
We now estimate regression models (1)-(3). The outcome of interest ijrt is the gross value of airtime
transferred from user j to user i in location r on day t. To implement our testing strategy, we need a shock
Srt that is exogenous to transfers on the mobile phone network. The primary shock that we exploit is a large
earthquake that occurred in the Western Rusizi and Nyamasheke districts of Rwanda on February 3, 2008.
The magnitude 6 earthquake left 43 dead and 1,090 injured. It destroyed 2,288 houses and caused regional
school closures and electrical outages. The eects of the earthquake, though large, were geographically
circumscribed. The United States Geographical Survey estimates an impacted radius of approximately 20
kilometers from the epicenter { see Figure (1). This event is ideal for our estimation strategy since the shock
is unequivocally exogenous and precisely located in time and space. We later demonstrate that our results
are robust to using alternative shock measures including a severe ood that occurred in late 2007.
We begin by estimating equation models (1)-(3) to measure the causal impact of the earthquake on
interpersonal transfers. We then turn to equation models (4) to (6) and test whether airtime transfers after
the earthquake vary systematically across users.
A Average eect of the earthquake
We rst estimate equation (1) at the district level. The dependent variable rt is the aggregated gross value
of transfers received on day t in district r. This value is obtained from the operator's transaction logs by
aggregating interpersonal transfers received by the cell tower of the receiver, and linking these towers to
specic districts. We use data from 30 days before to 30 days after the earthquake, though as demonstrated
in section 5 results our results change little if we use a dierent time window. District and day xed eects
are included as additional regressors to control for systematic dierences across districts and over time.
Results are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The earthquake shock variable Srt equals one on February
3rd 2008, the day of the earthquake, in the districts of Rusizi and Nyamasheke; it is zero otherwise. Robust
standard errors are reported, clustered at the district level. The number of observations corresponds to a 60
day window over 30 districts.
12We experimented estimating function f() in a number of ways. The results presented here rely on a simple linear regression
of bYid on ten measures of network usage and cell tower-level xed eects. This regression has an R2 of 0.39.
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Table 3: Average Eect of the Earthquake on Mobile Transfers Received (Gross)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
District Cell Tower User Dyad
Earthquake shock 14169*** 2832*** 9.48*** 11.92***
(1,951.30) (177.02) (0.74) (0.59)
Day dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed eects district tower user directed dyad
Number of observations 1800 16020 6619440 10566000
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors, clustered by district, reported
in parentheses.
We observe a strongly signicant positive coecient on the shock variable. The earthquake caused an
additional inux of 14,169 Rwanda Francs (RWF), or approximately $28 USD. Though modest in absolute
terms, this represents a large increase compared to an unconditional mean of 8,480 RWF in the two aected
districts. It is also large relative to the average annual income of roughly $1,000 USD in Rwanda.
In the second column of Table 3, we repeat the analysis at the more disaggregated level of the cell tower.
The number of cell towers (267) is larger than the number of districts (30), and this explains the larger
number of observations. The advantage of estimating model (1) at the tower level is that each observation
corresponds to a smaller geographical unit and thereby allows us to more precisely identify the regions
aected by the quake. Tower xed eects are included in the regression together with day-specic dummies.
Again we nd a statistically signicant coecient on the earthquake shock. Similar point estimates are
produced if we redene aected areas as those lying anywhere between 10 to 50 miles of the epicenter.
The earthquake produced an additional inux of approximately $84 USD to the 15 towers within 20km
of the epicenter. This amount is small in absolute terms, but at the time of the earthquake, the mobile
airtime transfer service had only recently been launched in Rwanda, and only 1,400 individuals living in the
earthquake region had used the service prior to the earthquake. Since the earthquake, service utilization
has increased over 400-fold. According to available information, there are currently 750,000 to 1,000,000
active users in Rwanda each day. This compares to 2,500 at the time of the earthquake. If we are willing to
assume that airtime transfers following an earthquake increase proportionally to the number of active users,
a similar earthquake today would cause an additional inux of US$22,000 to $30,000 to aected areas.13
The absolute value of transfers observed in February 2008 is also small because Rwanda is a small
country with a population of ten million, less than one million of whom owned a telephone at the time of
the earthquake. In Kenya the daily volume of money transferred over the mobile phone network is in excess
of US$200 million, compared to US$1,500 in Rwanda at the time of the quake. Again, if we are willing to
13If emergency transfers are proportional to trac and trac increases non-linearly in the number of subscribers, as much
of the network literature suggests, the projected amount may even be much larger. It is also conceivable, however, that early
adopters are not representative of late adopters and respond more strongly to an earthquake; in this case, transfers need not
increase proportionally with trac or the number of users.
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Table 4: Average Eect of the Earthquake on Mobile Transfers Received (Net)
(1) (2) (3)
District Cell Tower User
Earthquake shock 12823*** 3053*** 10.01***
(1600) (116) (1.082)
Day dummies yes yes yes
Fixed eects district tower user
Number of observations 1800 16020 6619440
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors, clustered by district,
reported in parentheses.
assume that emergency transfers would increase proportionally to the total volume of airtime transfers, we
would expect an inux of approximately US$11.2 million ($84 200M/1500) to aected districts.
Columns (3) and (4) repeat the estimation at the level of the individual user and of the dyadic pair
of individuals. In the individual user regression (2), the dependent variable irt is the amount of airtime
transfered to individual i in location r at time t. Users who never receive airtime transfers are excluded
since they do not help identify the eect of the shock, leaving roughly 110,000 unique individuals. The
estimated coecient is again positive and statistically signicant. Results from the dyad-level regression (3)
are presented in column (4) of Table 3. In this regression, pairs in which i never receives airtime from j
are ignored from the estimation, leaving roughly 180,000 valid dyads.14 Here too the shock coecient is
positive and statistically signicant. The evidence is thus consistent: at all levels of aggregation we observe
an increase in gross transfers.
As a robustness check, we redo the same analysis using net instead of gross transfers. The concern is that
gross transfers may misrepresent the aggregate magnitude of the transfers if individuals who receive airtime
pass it on to others in the same region. This could result in double-counting at the district or cell tower
level. For the individual user regression (2) we redene the dependent variable as  0irt =
P
j ijrt  
P
j jirt,
that is, the transfers received by i from others minus the transfers given by i to others. At the district and
cell tower levels, we proceed as follows. Let r1r2t =
P
i2r1
P
j2r2 ijrt where r1 and r2 are two dierent
locations (e.g., districts or cell tower area); r1r2t represents the total transfers received by individuals in
location r1 from individuals in location r2. Summing over all other locations yields the gross transfers from
other locations to location r1. Net inows to region r1 are thus 
0
r1t =
P
r2
r1r2t  
P
r2
r2r1t. We do not
replicate the dyadic regression since, in this case, net and gross transfers are indistinguishable.
Results, shown in Table 4, are not very dierent, both in terms of signicance and in terms of magnitude,
from those reported in Table 3. In the district level regression (column 1), the coecient of the shock variable
is slightly smaller than in Table 3. But in the regressions at the cell tower (column 2) and individual user
14Given the very large number of potential dyads, including dyads with no activity would be extremely challenging numerically.
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(column 3) levels, the coecient is slightly larger. This implies that the magnitude of our ndings is not
driven by double counting.
B Heterogeneous eects
We now introduce heterogeneous eects into the analysis. As outlined in Section B, we are looking for evi-
dence of whether airtime transfers after the earthquake are best understood as a manifestation of reciprocity
or charity. We have proposed three indirect tests: (1) if transfers are manifestation of charity, they are
unlikely to ow from the poor to the rich; not necessarily so if they follow a reciprocal motive; (2) if transfers
are embedded in reciprocal relationships, users with more such relationships should receive more after the
shock; (3) if transfers are based on a reciprocal arrangement, they are expected to fall with the distance
between giver and recipient because distance impinges observability and makes self-enforcing reciprocity
arrangements harder to sustain.
The purpose of this section is to investigate these three predictions in our data by estimating the regression
models (4) to (6). If people give primarily due to charitable motives, we expect transfers to ow primarily
from rich to poor, from urban to rural, and to increase the further away the sending is from the shock. If
people instead give primarily out of expectation of future reciprocity, we expect rich victims to receive more
than poor, more transfers to take place between users already in a relationship, and transfers to decrease
with the distance between sender and recipient.
Results for wealth are reported in Table 5. We worry that some users, especially richer users, may receive
more airtime but also transfer more to others. We therefore use net transfers as the dependent variable. At
the individual level we are using as wealth proxy the predicted expenditure variable
bbY id described in Section
3. At the district and cell tower levels, the wealth proxy is the sum of
bbY id over all users in that location.
To avoid spurious results, we also include interaction terms between the wealth proxy with the day of the
earthquake and with a dummy for presence in the earthquake aected region.
The coecient of interest is the coecient of the interaction term between wealth and shock in the
second row of Table 6. Results clearly show that richer users receive more airtime transfers in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake. The estimated coecient is largest in the user and dyad regressions, which
is what we would expect. In the dyad regression we are also able to include an interaction term with the
wealth of the sender. This term is not signicant.
These ndings are dicult to reconcile with a pure charity/altruistic motive. However, they are consistent
with transfers being embedded in reciprocal relationships in which people receive in-kind gifts they value {
in this case, airtime at a moment when better-o users wish to call relatives or emergency services. This
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Table 5: Net transfers and wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
District Cell Tower User Dyad
Earthquake shock 24,121*** 4,906*** 12.53*** 14.25***
(1,531.00) (978.52) (3.40) (3.28)
Wealth proxy of recipient * Shock 1.936*** 2.041** 17.57*** 13.69***
(0.15) (0.96) (5.14) (2.13)
Wealth proxy of recipient * Day of quake -0.315** -0.079 -1.32*** -0.54
(0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.40)
Wealth proxy of recipient * In quake region 1.38* 0.17
(0.73) (0.38)
Wealth proxy of sender * Shock 6.00
(6.00)
Wealth proxy of sender * Day of quake 0.63*
(0.37)
Wealth proxy of sender * In quake region 0.03
(0.42)
Day dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed eects district tower user directed dyad
Number of observations 1800 16020 6619440 10566000
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors, clustered by district, reported in parentheses.
interpretation nds additional support from observing that individuals with a higher value of
bbY id also receive
more airtime transfers on days other than the earthquake day.15
To further investigate the importance of relationships, we interact the earthquake shock with a proxy
for the social network of the recipient, namely the number of unique individuals with whom the person
communicated over the phone in the year prior to the earthquake. The number of contacts an individual
has does not necessarily imply that the person is in more reciprocal favor-exchange relationships, but the
two may be correlated.
Results are shown in Table 6. As before, district and cell tower values are the sum of the degree of
recipients in that location. The coecient of interest, that for the interaction term between the shock and
the degree of the recipient, is positive throughout but only signicant in the district and cell tower regressions.
In the dyadic regression we also include interaction terms for the degree of the sender. The coecient of the
interaction term with the shock has the expected sign but is not statistically signicant. Similar ndings
obtain with dierent measures of the recipient's social network, e.g., the number of unique individuals the
user has called, the number of unique individuals who called the user, the number of international contacts,
and the number of contacts with whom the user sent or received airtime. From this we conclude that there
is only mild evidence that the size of users' social network matters at the time of the earthquake.
Next we investigate whether individuals receive more in the aftermath of the earthquake if they are in
15These results, not shown, are obtained by regressing individual xed eects on the uninteracted covariates (in this case,
wealth), using one observation per individual (Chapter 10 Wooldridge 2002).
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Table 6: Net transfers and number of contacts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
District Cell Tower User Dyad
Earthquake shock 24,381*** 4,631*** 12.24*** 13.36***
(721.13) (415.26) (3.56) (2.58)
Degree of recipient * Shock 0.004*** 0.004** 0.05 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Degree of recipient * Day of quake 0.000 -0.000 -0.00*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Degree of recipient * In quake region 0.01* 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Degree of sender * Shock 0.01
(0.01)
Degree of sender * Day of quake 0.00
(0.00)
Degree of sender * In quake region -0.00*
(0.00)
Day dummies yes yes yes yes
Fixed eects district tower user directed dyad
Number of observations 1800 16020 6619440 10566000
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors, clustered by district, reported in parentheses.
relationships with a strong favor-exchange component. To this eect, we reestimate the dyad-level regression
presented in column (4) of Table 6, replacing the degree of the recipient with the accumulated amount of
transfers the recipients has received and given in the past. Reciprocal relationships are those in which
we observe a history of transfers, and the stronger this history of transfers, the stronger we expect the
favor-exchange relationship to be. Because we wish to focus on the nature of the relationship, we focus on
dyadic-level regressions.
Results are presented in Table 7. We see that individual i who has sent more airtime to individual j
in the past receives more help from j on the day of the earthquake. Having received airtime from j in the
past is not signicant. This is consistent with a reciprocal relationship: i has transferred airtime to j and j
reciprocates at the time of the earthquake when i is most likely to need help.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2, we also investigate whether transfers come uniformly from other
unaected regions of Rwanda, or whether transfers come primarily from unaected areas in the vicinity of the
earthquake. If transfers follow primarily a charitable motive, we expect all unaected areas to contribute; not
so if transfers are motivated by reciprocity, and relationships are strongest with people nearby. To examine
this possibility, we disaggregate each individual's social network by distance. We rst divide the number of
contacts of each user i into dierent groups, each corresponding to a distance range from i's location, with
distance ranging from 0 Km to 250 Km. We then interact each of these variables with the earthquake shock
and examine the transfers received by individual i in regression (5). Results are shown in Appendix Table
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Table 7: Net transfers and past reciprocity
Dyad Dyad (with FE)
Earthquake shock 12.095*** 11.898***
(0.948) (0.702)
Airtime sent in the past (from i to j) * Shock 0.462*** 0.476***
(0.124) (0.119)
Airtime sent in the past (from i to j) -0.172***
(0.009)
Airtime sent in the past * Day of quake 0.056 0.057
(0.041) (0.042)
Airtime sent in the past * In quake region 0.139*** 0.129*
(0.050) (0.073)
Airtime received in past (by i from j) * Shock 0.138 -0.167
(0.251) (0.278)
Airtime received in past (by i from j) 1.034***
(0.038)
Airtime received in the past * Day of quake -0.212*** -0.215***
(0.037) (0.054)
Airtime received in the past * In quake region -0.328*** -0.277
(0.121) (0.195)
Day dummies yes yes
Fixed eects no directed dyad
Number of observations 10566000 10566000
Notes: Outcome is ijrt, i.e. the airtime received by i from j on day t. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors, clustered by district, reported in parentheses.
13.
We rst note that, if we omit individual xed eects, we nd that the number of contacts at any distance
is correlated with the amount of money received in the absence of earthquake. This indicates that individuals
with more contacts are more likely to receive transfers in general. When we interact distance-specic degree
with the shock, however, results are dierent. We plot in Figure 3 the interaction coecients by distance,
together with a locally-weighted polynomial smoother to more clearly show the non-parametric relationship
between earthquake-induced transfers and distance. We observe that after the quake, people with many
contacts near the epicenter do not receive more transfers, presumably because nearby friends are also aected
by the earthquake. People with contacts more than 30 Km away from the epicenter are more likely to receive
transfers in the aftermath of the earthquake, but the eect dies down for contacts located more than 100
Km from the epicenter. This pattern is consistent with the predictions of a model of reciprocation in which
information and monitoring costs increase with distance and close range relationships therefore include a
stronger mutual insurance element.
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Figure 3: Relationship between the geographic structure of an individual's network and her propensity to
receive a transfer after the earthquake.
5 Robustness and Limitations
A Functional form assumptions
We briey show that our central results are not sensitive to the precise econometric specications, or to the
choice of time window (which in most regressions is restricted to the period starting one month before the
earthquake and ending one month after the earthquake). Table 8 presents estimates of the average treatment
eect of model (1) using the full dataset from October 2006 until July 2009 under a variety of econometric
specications. Column (1) gives the standard OLS results with no control variables Xrt, time xed eects
t, or tower xed eects r. Column (2) includes time-varying controls to account for regional variation
in mobile phone use, column (3) adds regional xed eects, and column (4) adds daily dummy variables.
Across all specications, the estimated eect of the shock remains strong and signicant, and of a magnitude
similar to that presented in Table 3.
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Table 8: Sensitivity of estimation to function form assumptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS OLS w/Controls Region FE Region & Day FE
Shock 1793.639*** 2819.503*** 2787.305*** 2710.861***
(313.08) (121.33) (136.18) (183.53)
Day of quake -748.548** -1375.294*** -1287.145***
(212.87) (111.76) (119.77)
In quake region -2262.728*** -510.751***
(577.57) (73.57)
Total call volume 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.103***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Outgoing transfers 0.677*** 0.637*** 0.527***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Tower Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
Date Fixed Eects No No No Yes
R2 0.008 0.702 0.729 0.753
N 171414 74895 74895 74895
Notes: Outcome is the total amount transferred into a tower on a single day. \In quake region"
dened as those towers within 20 miles of the earthquake epicenter. Columns 2-4 include controls for
overall network activity. Column 3 includes tower-level xed eects. Column 4 includes daily xed
eects. Estimates made using data from October 1, 2006 through July 1, 2008. Heteroskedasticity-
robust SE's in parentheses (clustered at district level). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
B Standard errors
As discussed in Section 2, for standard error estimates to be consistent in the dyadic regressions, they should
ideally be cross-clustered by sender i and recipient j. This is because transfers involving the same individual
are likely to be correlated with each other { e.g., if j transfer airtime to i, he is ceteris paribus less able to
transfer airtime to others. In the results presented so far we have clustered standard errors by the district
in which the recipient resides.
As a robustness check, Table (9) compares alternative methods of obtaining standard errors using dierent
levels of clustering: no clustering (column 1), by recipient (column 2), by sender (column 3), and by date
(column 4). Standard errors are largest when we cluster by recipient, but in all specications the coecients
of interest are highly signicant. In the last column of Table (9), we drop observations in such a way that
each sender j appears only once. More precisely, whenever a sender j appears multiple times, only one dyad
involving j is selected at random and kept for estimation purposes. This results in a smaller number of
observations but it eliminates the problem of correlation of errors at the source. The standard error is larger
{ if only because we dropped observations { but the coecient of interest remains signicant.
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Table 9: Robustness of dyadic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Clustering None Recipient j Sender i Day t Unique senders
Shock (recipient) 7.395* 7.395y 7.395* 7.395*** 6.923*
(3.70) (3.77) (3.77) (0.19) (2.67)
Prior ji (last month) -2.541*** -2.541*** -2.541*** -2.541*** -2.621***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.64) (0.33)
Prior ji * Shock 20.560 20.560 20.560 20.560*** 50.361
(16.80) (17.00) (17.07) (0.86) (38.91)
Day xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyad xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.053
N 4868562 4868562 4868562 4868562 2720077
Notes: Specication is identical to that used to produce Table ??, but standard errors are clustered
according to column labels. Column (5) clusters by recipient, but restricts sample to allow only
one recipient per sender. In cases were a single sender sends to multiple recipients, one recipient is
chosen at random and the others are dropped from the analysis. y p< 0:10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001.
C Placebo tests
As a robustness check of the average treatment eect, we verify that the eects of the earthquake on transfers
are unique to the day of the earthquake, and do not generally occur on days without signicant economic
shocks. We do this rst at the district level, following the methodology used to produce Table 3. In Appendix
Table 14, we include lag and lead terms to test whether there was a signicant eect of the earthquake on
transfer patterns in the days immediately before and after the earthquake. To identify these ten additional
terms, we include district-level data from the full dataset as in Table 8. In column 1, we observe that this
eect does not exist, and before the earthquake (lead1-lead3) and after the earthquake (lag1-lag7), there
was no signicant change in transfers to the aected regions. These results hold for lags and leads of up to
10 days. In columns (2) and (3), we see in contrast that national calls to the aected region increase in the
days following the earthquake. International calls do not. Critically, there was no anomalous increase in any
sort of mobile network trac in the days prior to the earthquake.
Appendix Table 15 presents results from testing the same specication as in column 4 of Table 3 but
with a \placebo" shock at the same location on dierent dates. Thus, we test for a spurious eect 1 and
2 months before, as well as 1 month after, the actual earthquake. In contrast to the results obtained for
the date of the actual earthquake, we observe no signicant change in transfers on the day of the placebo
earthquakes.
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D Other large covariate shocks
The results presented so far provide strong evidence that Rwandans used the mobile phone network to send
airtime to friends and families aected by a major earthquake, and that these results are robust to dierent
empirical specications. We now show that similar transfers are observed following other natural disasters.
During the period for which we have mobile phone data, there were no massive natural disasters on
the scale of the Lake Kivu earthquake. However, there were two major oods that severely disrupted the
lives of many Rwandans. These oods are not as well suited to our estimation strategy as the earthquake,
since oods are less precisely located in space (there is no single epicenter), and the timing is only partially
exogenous (prior weather patterns anticipate oods). Therefore, there are a priori reasons to expect that
the eect of a ood on transfers would be less pronounced than the eect of an earthquake.
Nonetheless, we do observe a signicant increase in transfers on the days following a severe ood. In
Table 10, we estimate equation (1) for the towers in the region of a ood that killed 17 during September
2007. We nd a modest but strongly signicant increase in airtime sent to regions aected by the ood. In
column (4) of Table 10, the point estimate is roughly half that of the corresponding point estimate of the
eect of the earthquake (column 4 of Table 8).
Table 10: Eect of ood on transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS OLS controls tower FE tower/Time FE
shock 1456.901 933.040 1029.241 1068.659
(770.84) (316.98) (329.36) (375.45)
Days of ooding 774.798 952.838 981.247
(166.92) (230.79) (206.75)
In ooded region 263.474 237.740
(919.80) (88.55)
Total calls 0.075 0.065 0.103
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Outgoing transfers 0.678 0.637 0.527
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
R2 0.000 0.702 0.729 0.753
N 171414 74895 74895 74895
\In ood region" dened as towers in the two districts aected by the ood. \Days of ood" are
9/12/07 - 9/18/07.
E Limitations
One limitation of our empirical strategy is the fact that we are not able to observe transfers that occur outside
of the mobile phone network. Thus, it is possible that the eect we observe is merely one of substitution,
and that individuals who send money over the network would have sent it using another mechanism. While
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Table 11: Alternative services for transferring money
Alternative Service Estimated Fees
(small transfers)
Availability Source
MoneyGram 7% - 100%
($15 minimum)
5 locations MoneyGram Website, 2010;
Orozco, 2009
Western Union 10%-100%
($10 minimum)
50 locations Western Union Website, 2010;
Orozco, 2009
Post Oce 8%-1% 19 branches World Bank Group, 2009; Remit-
tance Tanzania to Rwanda; Mu-
goya, 2009
Commercial Bank 6%-40% Urban and semi-urban areas World Bank Group, 2009; Remit-
tance Tanzania to Rwanda
Bus 6% - 20% Populous areas Kbbucho, et al. 2003; Kenya
Money Transfer Rates; Averaged
over Bus-Star/Scandinavian
Friends/Relative No fee, no stan-
dard system
Depends on social network Kbbucho, et al. 2003
Mobile-based transfers Free 3 million phones
we cannot reject this interpretation empirically, we note that at the time of the earthquake, there were very
few alternative methods for transferring money over distance. These alternatives are summarized in Table
11. MoneyGram, Western Union, and the Post Oce are the other ocial methods for transferring money,
but transaction costs across these services range from 10 - 100% of the value of the money sent. For each of
these services, it is impossible to transfer amounts under US$10. In the informal sector, the most common
method for transferring money is by bus/taxi, but for that service the driver typically charges 10-20% of
the amount transferred, and the availability of the service is contingent on the schedule of busses and the
condition of the roads. With the mobile transfer service, by contrast, the transfer of money is instantaneous
and has no associated fees or commissions.
An additional caveat of our analysis regards the utility of a mobile phone-based transfer in comparison to
a transfer of hard cash. During the time period we analyze, the mobile-based transfer system only allowed
for the transfer of airtime from one individual to another. Though the current system allows for the transfer
of money, which can be converted to cash or spent directly at many small stores, this was not the case in
early 2008. Thus, the transfers received by the victims of the earthquake were less liquid than a transfer of
money handed from one person to another.16 However, as mobile banking services are more fully developed,
these transaction costs are expected to be greatly reduced.17 It therefore seems plausible that our estimates
represent a lower bound on the amount of money that would be sent over the mobile network in response
16Whether the transfer is more or less liquid than a formal transfer over a service such as Western Union is ambiguous. Even
in 2008, airtime could easily be converted to cash through local resellers. Moreover, given the aforementioned evidence that as
much as 20% of household expenditures were on mobile phone-related expenses, it is likely that a transfer of airtime would lead
to inframarginal savings on the part of the recipient.
17 In Kenya for instance, there are over 23,000 locations where customers can go to convert mobile money into cash.
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to a current-day earthquake. As mobile money becomes more commonly used and more useful in the lives
of the poor, we would expect mobile networks to play an increasingly important role in allowing individuals
to share risk over distance.
6 Conclusion
Using detailed log data from Rwanda, we have tested whether individuals in locations aected by a natural
disaster receive transfers from unaected parts of the country. We nd a signicant increase in airtime sent to
individuals aected by the 2008 earthquake. The impact is robust to a variety of econometric specications,
and does not exist for a large number of \placebo" earthquakes on dierent dates and in dierent locations.
Based on simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, we estimate that the total response to similar current-day
earthquake in Rwanda would be between $22,000 and $30,000.
We interpret the anomalous transfers observed after the quake as prima facie evidence that people are
using the mobile network to help each other cope with economic shocks. However, the motives behind these
transfers are not clear ex ante. In particular, it is ambiguous whether people give out of purely charitable
motives, or whether they are giving out of an expectation of future reciprocity (or as a repayment for past
assistance). Building a simple model of giving over the mobile network, we show that these two motives for
giving produce conicting empirical hypotheses, in particular with respect to the marginal eect of wealth,
distance, and past reciprocity on the amount transferred following the earthquake. Testing these hypotheses
with the data from Rwanda, we nd that the giving observed after the earthquake is most consistent with
a model based on expectations of reciprocity.
Given the increasing prominence of mobile phones in the developing world, it is important that we
develop a better understanding of the economic impacts that this technology will have on the lives of their
users. In this paper, we argue that by allowing for inexpensive interpersonal transfers, mobile phones are
providing a new method for risk sharing. Since the alternative mechanisms used for interpersonal transfers
are considerably slower and more expensive, this immediate inux of support may be of material consequence.
As the capabilities of the mobile money system are further expanded, for instance to allow for purchase of
over-the-counter goods with airtime, the potential benets to users on the networks can be expected to
increase.
However, it is worth noting that the potential benets of the mobile-based service do not appear to be
evenly distributed. In prior work, we have shown that there are sharp divides between people who do and
don't own mobile phones. Most notably, relative to non-owners, phone owners are signicantly wealthier,
better educated, older, and more likely to be male (Blumenstock & Eagle 2010). And as we have noted in
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this paper, even among mobile phone owners, it is the wealthiest who are most likely to receive transfers
{ both on normal days and in the period immediately after a large economic shock. Thus, transfers of
airtime, or mobile-based transfers of money, may not reach the people who need them most. In the worst
case, the presence of mobile-phone based risk sharing networks may have an adverse eect on people who
are not a part of the network. If, for instance, wealthy individuals substitute out of informal risk sharing
arrangements and into predominantly phone-based arrangements, it is possible that poorer people will be left
with fewer opportunities for risk sharing. In this way, mobile phones could end up having a regressive eect,
as has been demonstrated with other technologies in similar contexts (Bieri et al. 1972). If such regressive
eects exist, it would suggest that blanket investment in telecommunications infrastructure may not have
the transformative economic impacts envisioned by the popular media. Instead, policies that more actively
target poorer segments of the population, and which lower barriers to adoption and use, might better ensure
that the potential benets of mobile phones are realized by those in the greatest need.
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A Network attributes
We compute summary statistics for a randomly chosen subset of 900 individuals. Users are stratied by
district and weighted to produce a statistics representative of the entire population of phone users.18
 Activation date: The date on which the phone rst appears in the transaction logs.
 Days of activity : The number of dierent days on which the phone was used.
 Net calls: Number of outgoing calls minus the number of incoming calls.
 Degree: Number of unique contacts with whom the person communicated (called or received a call).
 Daily degree: Average number of unique people contacted on any given day, conditional on phone use.
 Recharge: Monetary value deposited on SIM card.
 In/Out-degree: Number of dierent people to whom/from whom, calls were made/received.
 Clustering : Percentage of rst-degree contacts that have contacted each other.
 Betweenness: Average shortest path between the user and 50 randomly sampled numbers.
 Interpersonal transfers: Total airtime transfers (number sent + number received).
 Districts: Number of political districts in which the phone was used. Rwanda has 30 districts.
18Computing these statistics over the entire population of users would require massive computer time without adding anything
of substance. Users in this random sample were selected to be comparable to individuals used in main analysis.
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Table 12: Summary statistics of phone use as computed from transaction logs
Average
Panel A: Domestic and International Calls
Activation date 1/12/08
Days of activity 770.3
Avg. call length 31.7
Calls per day 6.25
Net calls per day (out-in) 0.087
Int'l calls per day 0.084
Net int'l calls (out-in) -0.014
Panel B: Social Network Structure
Degree 734
In-degree 488.2
Out-degree 433
Daily degree 3.78
Net daily degree (out-in) 0.00027
Clustering 0.063
Betweenness 2.72
Panel C: Other Behaviors
Credit used per day 163.5
Max. recharge value 2756.3
Avg. districts per day 1.36
Avg. districts contacted 1.21
Me2U transfers per day 0.044
Net Me2U transfers per day 0.00038
N 901
Notes: Mean values reported, weighted by sampling strata
to produce averages representative of entire phone popula-
tion.
B Additional tables and gures
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Predicted expenditures: DHS vs. Phone Survey
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Figure 4: Predicted expenditures: DHS vs. Phone Survey
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Table 14: Lagged eects of the earthquake on transfers and calls received.
(1) (2) (3)
Transfers Received Calls Received Int'l Calls Received
Shock 13512.649*** 14208.656*** 142.584*
(1335.51) (3753.46) (56.71)
shock lag1 -917.294 4594.386*** 126.538
(1330.88) (499.87) (76.47)
shock lag2 1540.204 1639.237 62.719
(2796.36) (1026.90) (49.83)
shock lag3 830.593 1297.175*** 47.690
(3157.92) (295.21) (33.18)
shock lag4 -189.597 552.066* -28.472
(1518.35) (208.00) (17.58)
shock lag5 -40.867 1070.376*** -66.248*
(3028.17) (229.54) (29.46)
shock lag6 -2648.816 927.869** -95.259
(3138.61) (303.77) (58.89)
shock lag7 -335.684 1468.774** -86.875
(849.38) (420.29) (46.27)
shock lead1 810.813 228.141 34.601
(1732.01) (316.09) (25.81)
shock lead2 1341.489 218.922 40.632
(1124.93) (387.07) (44.32)
shock lead3 -2460.249 -72.909 -24.811
(2003.26) (201.42) (59.38)
Total call volume 0.010
(0.01)
Outgoing transfers 0.876***
(0.02)
Outgoing calls 0.969***
(0.00)
Outgoing int'l calls 0.959***
(0.02)
Constant 155.928 2069.706 1417.339***
R2 0.984 1.000 0.943
N 16808 18840 18840
Notes: Outcome specied in column heading. All specications include daily and
district xed eects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis
(clustered at district level).
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Table 15: Placebo Tests - Region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 week early 1 month early 2 months early 1 month late 2 months late
placebo -55.046 -883.510 476.872 422.916 -165.949
(333.48) (671.79) (1098.90) (424.18) (356.80)
placebo lag1 -381.418 -53.947 -618.709 2003.713 11.852
(618.73) (217.97) (612.11) (1128.16) (247.78)
placebo lag2 -984.936 -1168.092 -26.755 50.986 1436.589
(541.80) (510.72) (458.54) (925.05) (302.94)
placebo lag3 -961.343 130.801 -1566.041 -2797.677 -254.537
(603.55) (484.92) (1163.88) (722.97) (333.08)
placebo lag4 -764.067 -828.406 -535.389 -542.332 662.051
(465.33) (349.95) (895.21) (609.62) (401.94)
placebo lag5 818.791 -1152.675 -388.534 396.936 83.309
(1436.49) (747.69) (1208.20) (548.55) (206.67)
placebo lag6 1032.607 -671.954 -789.253 -759.333 1191.760
(880.44) (182.22) (529.11) (1680.09) (586.25)
placebo lag7 252.983 88.647 268.176 225.380 835.777
(257.85) (838.98) (697.38) (1449.35) (250.26)
calls gross 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
me2u val out 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.529
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
cons 737.229 737.553 737.288 737.174 736.841
r2 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754
rmse 4025.238 4025.264 4025.233 4025.195 4025.252
N 74300.000 74300.000 74300.000 74300.000 74300.000
Outcome: Value of incoming airtime sent to people in district (in RWF; US$1=550RWF). Heteroskedasticity-robust
SE's in parentheses (clustered at district level).
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